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This paper demonstrates the usefulness of economic analysis for legal theory,
and in particular for law-making. Economic theory may be able to provide an-
swers to simple questions law-makers should ask. The title of this paper is an
example of such a simple question: will the eﬀects of a new EU directive meet
the expectations of law-makers, or will the outcome be just the opposite? With-
out a behavioral theory, it is hardly possible to predict the impact of a new law
on the behavior of the concerned actors. Economic analysis does not promise to
be simple, nor does it promise to give simple answers. However, it provides at
least some answers to lawyers’ questions.
The European Council has recently adopted1 the European Commission’s
“Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the
resale right for the beneﬁt of the author of an original work of art”.2 As soon
as the European Parliament agrees to the Council’s position, the new EU direc-
tive would require the member states of the European Union to establish resale
rights. This “droit de suite”,3 provides artists the right to collect a royalty
based on the resale price of their work.4 The European Commission’s initiative
was driven by three motives:
1See FAZ (2000).
2OJ (1998).
3Literally: “follow-on-right”; in German “Folgerecht”.
4Perloff (1998, 645). Taken literally, this principle would give the artist a claim on a
share of the resale price even if it is lower than the initial price. Karp/Perloff (1993, 167f.)
discuss resale royalties based on the diﬀerence between the resale and the initial price (“capital
gains”), however without deriving a systematic eﬀect of the two regimes on the artist’s income.
See also Bolch/Damon/Hinshaw (1988, 75).
2• to ensure “that creators of graphic and plastic works of art share in the
economic success of their original works of arts” (Recital 2);
• “to redress the balance between the economic situation of creators of
graphic and plastic works of art and that of other creators who beneﬁt
from successive exploitation of their work.” (Recital 2);
• a better functioning of the internal market in the Union. According to
the Commission, “disparities with regard to the existence and application
of the artist’s resale right by the Member States have a direct negative
impact on the proper functioning of the internal market in works of art”
(Recital 7). The application or non-application of such a right is consid-
ered to be a factor that contributes to distortions of competition as well
as displacements of sales within the Community (Recital 6).
The Commission expects about 250,000 artist to beneﬁt from the introduction
of a resale royalty in the EU.5 Currently, Belgium, Denmark, France and Ger-
many regularly enforce resale rights. Droit de suite also exists in Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, but without enforcement on a regular basis.6
Britain, the country with the most important art market in Europe, does not
have such legislation, as is the case in Ireland, Austria, and the Netherlands;
these EU member states opposed, until recently, the proposal.7 Since then,
some modiﬁcations of the Commission’s initiative have been made in order to
achieve consent. In the United States, only California has adopted a droit de
suite.8
In this paper, we take a closer look at the ﬁrst of the Commission’s above
mentioned motives. Our analysis is based on the idea that a dealer has three
economic functions which provide the gains from trade between the artist and
the dealer:9
• the dealer may have better access to capital markets, i.e. pay a smaller
interest rate, than the artist and therefore serves as an intermediary for
cheap credits;
• the dealer may (perhaps as well as the artist) spend eﬀort on the en-
hancement of consumer valuation in the resale market for the work of the
artist;
5EU Commission (1999).
6See O’Hagan (1998, 86), and FAZ (1999).
7FAZ (1999). In March, the Council has agreed upon introducing the new directive,
supported by the votes of 13 member states, whereas Austria and Belgium did abstain, see
FAZ (2000).
8See Karp/Perloff (1993, 163), who also mention Algeria, the former Czechoslovakia,
Chile, Poland, Sweden, Tunisia, and Uruguay to provide such guarantees - however, in most
countries the artists do not actually receive resale proceeds.
9In Kirstein/Schmidtchen (2000), an additional function is analyzed: an expert dealer
creates value by his ability to tell good from less talented artists.
3• if the artist is risk-averse, the dealer may provide insurance.
The impact of the introduction of a droit de suite on the dealer’s economic
functions is analyzed separately in the subsequent sections. Section 2 focuses
on the function of the dealer as a credit intermediary, and therefore excludes
risk-aversion and eﬀort considerations. It is assumed that the dealer’s discount
factor is higher than the artist’s, reﬂecting the lower interest rate the dealer pays
to obtain credit. We show that the artist’s lifetime income is always decreased
when resale royalties are introduced.
A similar result was derived by Karp/Perloff (1993). Their model neglects
the discounting of future payoﬀs whereas in our model discounting plays an
important role. Furthermore, the Karp/Perloff (1993) model puts the artist
in a surprisingly strong market position: he sets the initial market price and the
resale royalty, whereas the dealer only chooses promotional eﬀort and the resale
price. Our analysis goes beyond this, taking into account that artists may have
a weaker position in the initial market.
In section 2, the analysis is limited to the distribution of a given cooperation
rent, an aspect that was particularly stressed in the EU initiative. This neglects
the incentive eﬀects a droit de suite may have. Section 3 takes into account
that a droit de suite may aﬀect the two parties’ eﬀort to promote the value of
the artist’s work. Promotional eﬀort may increase the cooperation rent that
can be distributed between the two parties. First, we follow Karp/Perloff
(1993) and assume that the future valuation of the artist’s work depends only
on promotional eﬀort of the dealer. We show that the optimal resale royalty
is zero. An argument in favor of a resale royalty (“share-cropping”) contract
can only be derived if customers’ valuation in the resale market depends on the
eﬀorts of both artist and dealer. However, it would require additional reasons
to justify a mandatory droit de suite, since artists and dealers are free to agree
upon resale royalties by contract.
Section 4 introduces risk-aversion on the part of the artist. In such case, the
introduction of a droit de suite would have two eﬀects: it forces the artist to
accept a risky lottery instead of a sure income; and secondly, even if a resale
royalty had a positive net eﬀect on the artist’s monetary lifetime income due to
its incentive eﬀect, his lifetime utility may be decreased. This eﬀect, which we
call the “paradox of risk-aversion”, can occur if the income of the artist increases
over time. Section 5 brieﬂy summarizes the arguments, and discusses in which
direction legal harmonization in Europe should reasonably move.
42 Resale rights and lifetime income
2.1 Initial market and resale market
Droit de suite intends to let the artist participate in the future economic success
of his work. In some cases indeed, the resale price largely exceeds the price that
was initially paid by the dealer. A widely held view of the art business is the
image of a “collector who, having purchased a work of art for relatively little,
resells it for a great deal more, pocketing the entire proﬁt and leaving the artist
whose eﬀort created the work and whose subsequent accomplishments may have
contributed to its increase in value, with no part of such increase. It is the
image of Robert Rauschenberg and Robert Scull in tense confrontation after the
1973 auction at which Scull resold for 85 000 Dollars, a work for which he had
originally paid Rauschenberg less than 1 000 Pounds.”10
However, there is a simple economic reason for the enormous diﬀerences in the
prices at which dealers buy and sell art: from the dealers point of view, the
works of young and unknown artists are lotteries. He will frequently be unable
to resell the pieces, and of those sold only a few will be worth large sums.
Consider a simple example: a typical dealer buys one hundred pieces of art,
ten of which will be worth C - 100.000 some years later. The others will yield no
considerable return. Neither the dealer, nor the artists know the future value of
a speciﬁc piece of art. Assume both parties to be risk-neutral. The interaction
between dealer and artist, concerning one piece of work, takes place in three
steps (for simplicity assume that the piece is resold only once):
1. the dealer buys a piece of art from the artist (initial market);
2. nature reveals the artist’s true type (i.e., the valuation of the collectors);
3. the dealer sells the piece to a collector (resale market).
The initial market price is governed by three factors: the dealer’s maximum
willingness to pay, the artist’s minimum willingness to accept, and the market
conditions. Let us ﬁrst derive the dealer’s maximum willingness to accept. We
assume the dealer to be aware of the fact that only ten percent of all purchases
will turn out to be valuable in the ﬁnal market.11 Hence, when considering his
situation in the initial market, he expects an average resale price of C - 10.000 for
each of the pieces he buys. Assume furthermore that the dealer discounts future
gains by 20 percent. This discount factor of 0.8 reﬂects the interest rate and
the time until the resale is realized.12 Thus, the dealer’s present value of this
10Weil (1983), c.f. O’Hagan (1998, 100, Fn. 18).
11In Kirstein/Schmidtchen (2000), we take a closer look on expert dealers that are able
to distinguish between good artists and less talented ones.
12If the annual interest rate is denoted as i and the resale takes place t years after the initial
purchase, then the discount factor for the future returns is 1/(1+i)t. Obviously, the discount
factor is higher if the interest rate is lower.
5portfolio is C - 8.000, which is the maximum amount the dealer would be willing
to pay.13
The artist will accept a price in the initial market if it exceeds the present
value of the expected return the artist earns if he stores the work until he
sells it on his own.14 Let us assume that the artist’s discount factor is 0.6,
thus smaller than the dealer’s. This reﬂects the fact that the dealer may have
better access to the capital market (a lower interest rate means a higher discount
factor). Additionally, young artists will only very occasionally be able to provide
collateral if they apply for credit directly. The artist’s minimum willingness to
accept is the discounted value of the average return in the resale market, C - 6.000.
The diﬀerence between the dealer’s C - 8.000 and the artist’s C - 6.000 is the co-
operation rent that is created if the dealer and the artist conclude a contract.
If the initial market is competitive, then the elasticities of demand and supply
govern the distribution of this cooperation rent by the initial market price. In
bilateral monopolies, it is the relative bargaining power of the parties that de-
termines the price and thereby the distribution of the cooperation rent. Thus,
the split rate could be a result of a competitive market process as well as of
bilateral monopoly negotiations and is assumed to be independent of whether a
droit de suite is introduced or not. This approach allows us to model the eﬀects
on prices without having to explicitly model the market structure.15
A split rate close to 1 could be interpreted as the market situation of a young
artist who is already well established (in economic terms: whose work is hetero-
genized), and who has some market power in the inital market. This would be
the case if dealers outbid each other to come into business with this artist. On
the other hand, a split rate close to zero refers to the situation of completely
unknown young artists whose works are, from the dealer’s point of view, perfect
substitutes. In this case, the artists outbid each other to get access to a dealer.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the cooperation rent is equally shared
among the dealer and the artist. Therefore, the initial market price, without a
droit de suite is calculated as
0.5 · C - 8.000 + 0.5 · C - 6.000 = C - 7.000 (1)
Figure 1 illustrates this method of determining the market price. Recall that
the dealer’s maximum willingness to pay is C - 8.000, and the artist’s minimum
willingness to accept is C - 6.000. The cooperation rent of C - 2.000 is split equally
13If the dealer had operating costs, these would further decrease his maximum willingness
to pay, but the eﬀect of the droit de suite would qualitatively be the same.
14O’Hagan (1998, 90) remarks that the artist “always has the possibility of holding on
to his/her work for investment purposes, if there is reason to believe that the work will
appreciate”. Only for simplicity we assume the artist produces at zero marginal costs.
15Karp/Perloff (1993, 165) also analyze the case of an artist-owned gallery. In terms
of our model, this kind of vertical integration would be reﬂected by a split rate of 1 (the
artist internalizes the whole cooperation rent) and equal discount factors. Obviously, the
dealer-artist cannot be made better oﬀ by introducing a droit de suite.









between the two parties. Each one gets C - 1.000 of the cooperation rent. This is
realized by an initial market price of C - 7.000.
2.2 Introduction of a droit de suite
If a droit de suite is established, either by mandatory law or by contract, then
the artist holds a right to a share ρ < 1 of the resale price. A resale royalty is
a kind of excise tax on art that must be paid each time the piece is resold.16 It
can also be seen as an attenuation of the buyer’s property rights. Both points
of view allow for the same prediction: the buyer’s maximum willingness to pay
is decreased. A rational dealer will discount the expected resale royalty and
subtract its present value from the amount he is willing to pay if a droit de
suite were not in place. We assume that the dealer (and not the collector who
buys the work in the resale market) must bear this “excise tax”.17 Thus, the
dealer’s maximum willingness to pay drops to (1 − ρ) · C - 8.000.
The artist compares two options: to store the work yields C - 6.000, which is
the expected return, weighted with the artist’s discount factor. If he uses this
option, then the droit de suite plays no role. On the other hand, the artist may
sell his work to the dealer. Let p denote the initial market price paid by the
dealer if a droit de suite is in place. The artist not only receives the current
return p, but also a claim to the resale royalty. However, this additional income
is uncertain and only due in the future; it therefore must be discounted. The
present value of this claim is ρ · C - 6.000. Hence, an initial market price p is
acceptable for him if p+ρ·C - 6.000 is greater than C - 6.000. Stated equivalently,
the artist accepts a price p if
p > (1 − ρ)C - 6.000 (2)
The right hand side of inequality (2) denotes the artist’s minimum willingness
16The EU Commission rejects the view that resale royalties are “just a further tax”, since
the proceeds go to the artist, not the state, see EU Commission (1999). However, the economic
eﬀect in the resale market is just the same as if a tax were imposed.
17This assumption seems to be rather reasonable when the supply in the resale market is
inelastic, which is the case in our model: the supply in the resale market equals the amount
traded on the initial market and therefore is constant.
7to accept if a droit de suite is introduced. Calculating the market price p the
same way as in equality (1) leads to
p = 0.5 · (1 − ρ) · C - 8.000 + 0.5 · (1 − ρ) · C - 6.000 (3)
since the split rate is assumed to be independent of whether a droit de suite is
introduced or not. Thus, p equals (1 − ρ) · C - 7.000. The introduction of a droit
de suite, therefore, leads to an initial market price which is necessarily smaller
than the one without resale royalties.18
The diﬀerence in market price with and without droit de suite is ρ·C - 7.000. The
artist’s return at the time he sells his piece of art to the dealer is reduced by this
amount. The net eﬀect of a droit de suite on the present value of the artist’s
lifetime income is the present value of the resale royalty minus the decline in
the initial market price:
ρ · C - 6.000 − ρ · C - 7.000 = −ρ · C - 1.000 (4)
Under the assumptions we have made, this net eﬀect is always negative. Note
that our result not only proves true for the example we used, but also for any
other split rate or other resale market returns.19 The net eﬀect would be positive
if, and only if, the artist’s discount factor would exceed the dealer’s. However,
in such a case, a cooperation rent would cease to exist: gains from trade can
only occur between the artist and the dealer if the discount factor of the latter
exceeds that of the former.20 If this is the case, then the droit de suite puts the
artist deﬁnitely into a worse position. Hence, the EU directive not only fails to
achieve its most important goal, to let the artists participate in the economic
success of their work, but leads to the opposite result.
Note that the artist’s loss increases in the split rate.21 The better his position in
the initial market, the more the artist looses when a resale royalty is introduced.
Hence, if a droit de suite is established, successful artists have more to lose.
This theoretical result may explain the observation of Parachini (1990, F3),
according to which 40 established artists (among them Wilem de Kooning and
Roy Lichtenstein), in 1988, opposed a US Congressional initiative to introduce
a resale royalty in all US states. According to the report, the artists’ reason
for their opposition was that a droit de suite “might make it even harder for
unknown artists to attract the interest of collectors”. In the light of our analysis
this is correct, yet also appears to be somewhat hypocritical.22
18See Perloff (1998, 645), Karp/Perloff (1993), Hansman/Santilli (1996, 69).
19See Kirstein/Schmidtchen (2000).
20For the moment, we have left aside other economic reasons for cooperation rents, such
as insurance, screening, or promotional eﬀort. Insurance and promotion are analyzed in the
subsequent sections.
21This is proven in Kirstein/Schmidtchen (2000).
22The bill has not passed Congress, see Karp/Perloff (1993, 163). Landsburg (1989)
argues in the opposite direction: a droit de suite may shift income from less known to successful
artists. However, Solow (1990) rejects this argument, see Karp/Perloff (1993, 174f.),
endnote 6.
83 Incentive compatible contracting
3.1 Dealer’s eﬀort
The analysis of the relationship between an artist and a dealer within a simple
market framework might be seriously misleading. Often the relationship has
a pooling character, like team production, which can best be analyzed using
the concept of relational contracts. According to this concept the artist and
the dealer are playing a repeated game in good faith. Neither is trying to gain
an advantage at the expense of the other side. Rather, both see themselves as
members of a team acting co-operatively in order to increase the economic value
of the relationship.
A dealer incurs substantial costs in buying, owning, conserving and promoting
sales. He has usually tied up speciﬁc investments in the work of art, expecting a
reasonable rate of return or, in economic terms, a “quasi rent”. If resale royalties
reduces this quasi rent, the incentives of the dealers may be aﬀected in a way
that harms the artist.
As in Karp/Perloff (1993), we ﬁrst analyze the situation in which only the
promotional eﬀort of the dealer is relevant to the customers’ valuation in the
resale market. Let us, for simplicity, distinguish two cases:
• the dealer does not spend additional eﬀort, hence the average resale price
remains C - 10.000;
• or the dealer undertakes additional eﬀort to promote the value of the
artist’s work.
Assume that the additional eﬀort costs the dealer an amount of e, and increases
the average value of the artists work to, say, C - 15.000.23 Thus, high eﬀort in-
creases the average return in the resale market by C - 5.000. In this section, we
neglect discounting of future payoﬀs and focus on eﬀort only, hence the average
resale price reﬂects the parties’ maximum willingness to pay and minimum will-
ingness to accept, respectively, in the initial market. To analyze the impact of
promotional eﬀort on the value of the artist’s work in the resale market, we have
to distinguish two concepts: the ﬁrst-best eﬀort and the individually rational
decision.
The ﬁrst-best eﬀort maximizes the common proﬁt of the dealer and the artist,
disregarding the possible conﬂict between the two parties. It would be ﬁrst-best
to spend high eﬀort if the increase in valuation in the resale market exceeds the
eﬀort costs. Hence, it is ﬁrst-best to spend high eﬀort if, and only if,
e < C - 5.000 (5)
23In principle, this increase can have two reasons: the resale value of the artist’s work is
increased, or the probability that an artist turns out to be successful increases (or both).
9The individual decision of the dealer is not necessarily based on this comparison.
The dealer spends high eﬀort if his individual share of the return exceeds his
eﬀort costs. Recall that, if a droit de suite is established, the dealer only receives
a share (1−ρ) of the return in the resale market. Therefore, he is motivated to
spend high eﬀort if, and only if,
e < (1 − ρ) · C - 5.000 (6)
A comparison of the inequalities (5) and (6) leads to the following results:
• If e > C - 5.000, then it is eﬃcient not to spend high eﬀort, and the dealer
makes the eﬃcient choice.
• If e < (1 − ρ) · C - 5.000, then it is eﬃcient to spend high eﬀort, and the
dealer makes the eﬃcient choice.
• If e is in between (i.e., (1 − ρ) · C - 5.000 < e < C - 5.000), then it would be
eﬃcient to choose high eﬀort, but the dealer is not motivated to do so and
chooses low eﬀort instead.
The interval in which the dealer behaves ineﬃciently vanishes if ρ = 0. Thus,
from an eﬃciency point of view, the optimal mandatory resale royalty would be
ρ = 0. This is not only in accordance with the result in Karp/Perloff (1993,
165),24 but also with the standard results of contract theory, given that both
artist and dealer are risk-neutral. In such a situation, a “sell the shop” contract
would be optimal: the dealer pays a ﬁxed amount to the artist and becomes
residual claimant. In contrast to this, a mandatory droit de suite would force
the parties into a “share cropping” contract, which induces the dealer to choose
a suboptimal low eﬀort.25
A “sell the shop” contract allocates the entire risk to the dealer. If he were
assumed to be risk-averse, whereas the artist is risk-neutral, then a reallocation
of risk would be eﬃcient. In such a case, a resale royalty could be an eﬃcient
contract. This, however, does not seem to be the world the EU Commission
had in mind when making its proposal.
3.2 Artist’s eﬀort
Let us turn to the second scenario: the expected return on the resale market
depends on the eﬀort of the artist rather than of the dealer. An artist has several
ways to increase the value of a piece he has already sold to a dealer, such as
24Even though these authors do not perform a rigorous derivation of optimal contracts, they
come to the result that resale royalties reduce the dealer’s incentives to spend promotional
eﬀort.
25This holds in general if the dealer’s choice set is continuous; if he chooses his eﬀort from a
discrete set, such as high or low, share cropping could be optimal as well. However, “sell the
shop” would still be optimal in this case and nothing is gained by a mandatory resale royalty.
10producing additional pieces of high quality, investing in his skills, seeking further
inspiration, and making contacts with potential buyers and intermediaries.26 In
principle, the artist’s eﬀort may have a substitutional or complementary eﬀect
on the expected return on his earlier work. Here, we consider the complementary
eﬀect: future work of high quality is assumed to increase the valuation of the
life’s work of the artist.27
If the artist spends high eﬀort, he bears costs f > 0, whereas in the case of low
eﬀort his costs are 0. Let us again assume that this increase amounts to C - 5.000.
Thus, it is ﬁrst-best to spend high eﬀort if, and only if, f < C - 5.000. From the
artist’s point of view, it is individually rational to spend high eﬀort if his share
of the increased return (namely ρ · C - 5.000) exceeds the eﬀort costs f. Just as
in the case above, we have three cases to distinguish:
• if f > C - 5.000, then the artists abstains from high eﬀort, which is eﬃcient
to do so;
• if f < C - 5.000·ρ, then the artists chooses high eﬀort, which is eﬃcient to
do so;
• if ρ · C - 5.000 < f < C - 5.000, then high eﬀort would be eﬃcient, but from
the artist’s point of view it is better to choose the ineﬃcient low eﬀort.
The interval in which the artist may behave ineﬃciently vanishes if ρ = 1, which
implies that the artist not only receives a share of the resale price, but the whole
return. In such a setting, a dealer is not necessary, and the entire risk should
be borne by the artist. It would be optimal if the artist simply stores his pieces
and waits until they have gained their resale value.
If, however, the artist were assumed to be risk-averse, then it would be ineﬃcient
to let him bear the entire risk.28 In this case, a contract should balance the
artist’s desire for insurance against the motivational eﬀect of the residual claim.
However, such a contract would not lead to the ﬁrst-best solution, which is not
attainable due to the risk-aversion of the artist. A resale royalty may at most
be second-best: the artist sells the main part of the residual claim in turn for
an up-front payment to the dealer, yet the prospect of receiving a share of the
uncertain resale returns keeps the artist motivated to spend at least some eﬀort
on the enhancement of these returns.
26The impact of the artist’s activities on the value of a piece of art sold is not taken into
consideration in Karp/Perloff (1993).
27The substitutional eﬀect would be reﬂected by the idea of Coase (1972): the later
output of a monopolist may be seen as a substitute for his earlier works which tends
to decrease the value of each piece of work. See Karp/Perloff (1993, 169) and
Schmidtchen/Koboldt/Kirstein (1998, 789).
28We take a closer look on risk-aversion and droit de suite in the next section.
113.3 Both parties’ eﬀorts
Things are more complicated when the expected resale return depends on the
eﬀorts of both the artist and the dealer. First of all, the contract should deal
with the fact that now both parties may have an incentive to spend less than
the optimal eﬀort (double-sided moral hazard). Secondly, the parties’ eﬀorts
may inﬂuence each other. In particular, they may have a complementary or a
substitutional eﬀect. We consider the complementary eﬀect here: future work
of high quality does not only tend to increase the value of the life’s work of
the artist, but also increases the marginal eﬀect of the dealers eﬀort (and vice
versa).29
To keep matters simple, we limit the choices of the parties to high and low
eﬀort. Let us denote the high eﬀort of the dealer as e = 1 and of the artist as
f = 1, whereas e = f = 0 represents both parties’ low eﬀort. The expected
return on the artist’s work is denoted as q = q(e+f). Three levels of q have to
be distinguished: q(2), if both parties contribute; q(1) if only one party spends
eﬀort; q(0), if neither party contributes.
The marginal eﬀect of either party’s eﬀort on the expected return is positive,
thus q(2) > q(1) > q(0). The two party’s eﬀorts are strategic complements,
hence the marginal eﬀect of one actors contribution is higher if the other has
made a contribution as well: q(2) − q(1) > q(1) − q(0).
Table 1: The eﬀort game
dealer e = 1 e = 0
artist
(1 − ρ) · q(2) − k (1 − ρ) · q(1)
f = 1
ρ · q(2) − c ρ · q(1) − c
(1 − ρ) · q(1) − k (1 − ρ) · q(0)
f = 0
ρ · q(1) ρ · q(0)
The parties may bear diﬀerent costs for high eﬀort: let us denote the artist’s
cost as c and the dealer’s as k. If both spend eﬀort, the (expected) social net
surplus of the two parties is q(2) − c − k, which we assume to be positive and
greater than q(0): it would be eﬃcient if both were spending eﬀort. However,
29The resulting interactive decision-making situation is called a “supermodular game”, see
Fudenberg/Tirole (1992). In case of a substitutional eﬀect, the marginal eﬀect of one party’s
eﬀort on the expected return is diminishing in the eﬀort chosen by the other party.
12this is not necessarily the outcome if the parties maximize their own (expected)
payoﬀ. Table 1 shows the interactive decision situation as a game in strategic
form. Recall that the artist’s share of the expected return is denoted as ρ, hence
the dealer’s share is (1 − ρ).
The eﬃcient outcome e = 1,f = 1 is a Nash equilibrium30 if, and only if, the
following relations hold: ρ · q(2) − c > ρ · q(1) (which guarantees that f = 1 is
the best reply for the artist if the dealer chooses e = 1), and (1−ρ)·q(2)−k >
(1 − ρ) · q(1) (which implies that e = 1 is the best reply to f = 1). Both
conditions say nothing more than the individual costs of choosing high eﬀort
should be smaller than the individual gain, given the other side chooses high




q(2) − q(1) − k
q(2) − q(1)
(7)
If the parties agree upon a ρ that satisﬁes condition (7), then this contract turns
the eﬃcient outcome into a Nash Equilibrium.31 Note that the interval in (7)
is non-empty if, and only if, q(2) − q(1) > c + k. If this condition is violated,
then there is no value of ρ that turns (e = 1,f = 1) into a Nash-equilibrium.
A numerical example might help to understand the meaning of condition (7): let
q(2)= C - 100.000, q(1)= C - 10.000 and q(0)= C - 0. This satisﬁes the complement
property, since 100.000−10.000 > 10.000−0. Let furthermore be c= C - 9.000 and
k= C - 45.000, which satisﬁes the eﬃciency condition (100.000−45.000−9.000 >
0). Table 2 shows the decision situation in this example (the ﬁgures are in
C - 1.000).
Table 2: Example eﬀort game
d e = 1 e = 0
a
100 · (1 − ρ) − 45 10 · (1 − ρ)
f = 1
100 · ρ − 9 10 · ρ − 9
10 · (1 − ρ) − 45 0
f = 0
10 · ρ 0
30A strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium if no player has an incentive to deviate from
it.
31It is possible that (e = 0,f = 0) as well is a Nash equilibrium; a case which is not of
interest for our analysis here.
13Using these parameters, condition (7) translates to 9.000/90.000 < ρ <
45.000/90.000, or 0.1 < ρ < 0.5. In this example, a very low value of ρ im-
plements eﬃcient behavior as a Nash equilibrium.32 This is due to the cost
structure: the dealer’s costs were assumed to be nine times as high as the
artist’s costs. The low share for the artist is not only eﬃcient, but also reﬂects
fairness considerations: the party that has to bear the higher costs, should get
the greater share of the output.
4 Risk-averse artists
Until now it was assumed that the actors are risk-neutral. It has been shown
in the previous sections that, leaving aside incentive eﬀects, the introduction of
a droit de suite tends to harm the artists. If, on the other hand, both sides’
eﬀorts to promote the resale value of the work are relevant, a resale royalty can
be the incentive compatible contract, as it was shown in section 3.3, and may
lead to a higher monetary income for the artist.
The assumption of risk-neutrality will be maintained in this section with respect
to the dealer because he is able to spread his risk over a portfolio of diﬀerent
assets. The individual artist, however, relies on only one source of income,
especially if he is completely devoted to his work. Therefore, it seems reasonable
to assume that artists are risk-averse.33
Risk aversion is modeled by a concave utility function. The marginal utility
of income is positive (more money brings more utility), but the rate at which
an additional unit of income increases the utility is diminishing. There are two
reasons why this kind of utility function makes it more likely that a droit de
suite is harmful for the artist.
First of all, resale royalties oblige the artist to a lottery that can adversely
aﬀect his utility if he is risk averse. It could be beneﬁcial to receive a higher
32In fact, four equilibrium constellations are possible, depending on the value of ρ (and
neglecting ties):
• 0 < ρ < 0.1: f = 0 is dominant, e = 0 is the best reply.
• 0.1 < ρ < 0.5: Both e = f = 1 and e = f = 0 are Nash equilibria.
• 0.5 < ρ < 0.9: f = 0 is dominant and e = 0 is the best reply.
• 0.9 < ρ < 1: e = 0 and f = 1 are dominant strategies.
Note that 0.1 < ρ < 0.5 implements eﬃcient behavior as one out of two Nash equilibria.
33A decision-maker is risk-averse if he prefers not to take part in a “fair” lottery. A lottery
is called fair if the ticket price equals the expected gain. Consider a lottery that pays C - 100
with probability 0.1 and nothing otherwise. Its expected value hence is C - 10. If the lottery is
fair, then a risk-neutral decision-maker would be indiﬀerent whether to participate or not. A
risk-averse decision maker, on the other hand, would strictly prefer to keep the ticket prize. He
would take part if he had to pay less than the expected gain. If the risk-averse is indiﬀerent
between the lottery and a ticket price of, say, C - 7, then the diﬀerence of C - 3 is the “risk
premium” this decision-maker wants to earn before trading in the ticket prize for the prospect
on a uncertain return.
14(and secure) initial ﬁxed income rather than a lower one which is combined
with a risky payment in the future.34 If the artist had the right to waive the
resale right (and the dealer would agree), the artist could buy himself out of the
lottery. However, a waiver is not permitted under the EU directive.
Additionally, if the artist is unable to obtain credit against his claim, the droit
de suite shifts income from his youth to his older age. The artist is forced to
accept a lower income now, in exchange for some uncertain future gain, shifting
income to a perhaps more prosperous stage of his life.35 This transfer of a part
of the artist’s current income to the future may be harmful even if the present
value of the lifetime income stream is increased.36
A numerical example should make clear this paradox of risk-aversion: Assume
that a young artist has an annual income of C - 16.900. The introduction of
resale royalties leads to a decrease of, say, C - 2.500. His new annual income is
then C - 14.400. Making use of a concave utility function like U(x) =
√
x, where
x is the income and U the utility, the artist gets 130 utility units before, and
120 utility units after the introduction of the droit de suite: thus, the droit de
suite leads to a current loss of ten utility units.
Assume now that, in his later life, the artist has an annual income of C - 90.000
and the resale royalty brings him an additional income of C - 3.025.37 This is
equivalent to 300 utility units without the droit de suite, and 305 utility units
after the introduction of it. The introduction brings an additional utility of 5
units. These ﬁgures are displayed in table 3, where the label “no dds” stands
for the situation without a droit de suite, and “with dds” denotes the situation
if a resale royalty is introduced.
Table 3: Lifetime income and utility
in C - in utility units
no dds with dds no dds with dds
young 16.900 14.400 130 120
old 90.000 93.025 300 305
Σ 106.900 107.425 430 425
Adding up the income as well as the utility in the two years under consideration,
the artist earns C - 106.900 without droit de suite, and C - 107.425 if a droit de suite
is introduced; hence, the resale royalties increase his monetary income by C - 525.
However, his lifetime utility is decreased: without droit de suite, overall utility
34See Karp/Perloff (1993, 171).
35O’Hagan (1998, 89).
36This argument was presented in Schmidtchen/Koboldt/Kirstein (1998).
37According to Filer (1986), young artists earn less, but show a steeper lifetime income
proﬁle than the average workers of the same age.
15adds up to 430 utility units, whereas with resale royalties it is only 425 utility
units. The utility loss at a younger age due to the introduction of a droit de
suite exceeds the utility gain from the resale royalty.
The economic reason for this is straightforward: Having an additional C - in a
situation where the income is low can bring much more utility than having this
additional C - in a situation where the income is already high. According to our
example, this even holds true when discounting of future income and utility as
well as the riskiness of the resale royalty is neglected. If future income were
subject to discounting, this eﬀect would be even greater.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to analyze whether the introduction of a mandatory
droit de suite will make artists better oﬀ. The answer is, to say the least,
unclear. Leaving the eﬀort issue aside and focusing only on the distribution of
a given expected return on the resale market, the droit de suite clearly places
the artists in a worse position. Taking the incentive eﬀect into account, three
cases must be distinguished:
• a resale royalty would be counterproductive if only the dealer’s eﬀort is
required to promote the value of the artist’s work. However, the droit
de suite might be at least second-best if the dealer were assumed to be
risk-averse, whereas the artist is risk-neutral.
• If, on the other hand, only the artist’s eﬀort is relevant to promoting the
value of his work, then he should be the residual claimant. The artist
should circumvent the dealer and sell his work on his own behalf.
• If both the artist’s and the dealer’s eﬀorts may increase the expected
return in the resale market, then a crop sharing contract can implement
eﬃcient behavior.
However, even if a resale royalty forms part of a contract on the initial market,
an increase in the artists’ lifetime income does not necessarily mean that their
position is improved. If they are risk-averse, they are likely to lose. First of all, a
droit de suite increases the volatility of their lifetime income. Additionally, the
income shift from younger to older age induced by resale royalties can decrease
the utility derived from the artist’s lifetime income even if the monetary value
of his income is higher than without a droit de suite.
Even if a resale royalty were eﬃcient, this would not yet justify a mandatory
droit de suite. The artist and the dealer would have an incentive to do this
voluntarily. Such a contract may yet be diﬃcult to specify or to enforce.38
38A very simple way - which is completely free of enforcement costs - for an artist to
guarantee participation in the increasing value of his work would be to withhold a few pieces.
16Prohibitively high transaction costs are thus a standard rationale for mandatory
legislation;39 in this case the law may sensibly provide a standard contract. If
droit de suite is ineﬃcient, but distributes the smaller “cake” in a way that is
more favorable for the artists, this might provide another reason for mandatory
legislation.
However, there may arise practical diﬃculties in enforcing the proposed legis-
lation.40 Dealers may try to circumvent the droit de suite by selling works of
art in a jurisdiction where no resale royalties apply. This would prevent the
dealer’s maximum willingness to pay from decreasing, but nevertheless Europe
would lose a share of the art market.41
Furthermore, one should carefully determine whether Europe is the optimal le-
gal area for the issue in question. If not, then harmonization itself is not a
reasonable goal. Even if one agrees that Europe is the optimal legal area, then
the additional question arises towards which direction harmonization should
take place.42 One should keep in mind that the droit de suite provides the
greatest losses for the most talented artists. Taking this into account, harmo-
nization should rather be directed towards the abolition of the droit de suite
in the countries where it exists than towards the introduction of it in the other
countries.
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